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Abstract: During World War II, the Allied forces mounted an amphibious assault on the occupied
French coastal town of Dieppe. Since its execution, the raid on Dieppe has become a very contro
versial topic. The operation had an abundance of flaws that caused many casualties. This article
analyzes both issues and who, if any one should have been held responsible.
Keywords: World War II, Canadian military, amphibious assault, Operation Jubilee, Dieppe
On August 19, 1942, Allied forces consisting of mostly Canadian troops mounted a fullscale assault on a small port in Dieppe, France. Prior to this assault, Allied forces had been forced to
withdraw from the western front at Dunkirk in June 1940, which left the eastern front in the Soviet
Union’s territory as the only active front against Germany. By 1941, German forces were within
striking distance of Moscow.1 This raised many concerns that the Soviet Union might fall to Hitler’s
forces. Joseph Stalin, the leader of the Soviet Union, urged Great Britain to reopen the western front to
draw some of the German forces out of Russia and give his soldiers some relief. This desperate need
for assistance led the British military to devise a plan to reclaim territory in France.
The plan was premature and had many flaws including late tanks, limited air support,
misplaced landing crews and the loss of the element of surprise, which doomed the Canadian forces.
In total, 907 Canadian soldiers were killed, 2,460 were wounded, and 1,946 were taken prisoner.2 The
losses were tremendous. There is a mountain of questions still left unanswered today. What was the
original plan? How was this plan approved? Was it approved through official military channels? What
issues needed to be addressed prior to a successful raid? How did the military react to this disaster?
Was anyone at fault? Who should have been held accountable?
It was determined by the Combined Operations Headquarters, commanded by British
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Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, that a temporary assault on a seaport would display the Allied
powers’ ability to mount a full-scale attack by landing craft from the English Channel.3 According to
Bernie Anderson, a Canadian soldier who played a role in the Dieppe Raid, “The idea was for a short,
sharp assault on the small French port of Dieppe to encourage the struggling Soviet Union, to boost
morale on the home front, and to provide the bored, obstreperous Canadians a taste of action.”4 Up
until this point, the Canadian forces had been stationed in Great Britain along the English Channel
to protect against a German raid that would never happen.5 With no action yet for the Canadians, the
home front was beginning to get anxious. The initial plan was simple. Historian Bill Twatio comments
that “The Allied forces would seize and hold the town until sunset, destroy the defences, take prisoners
and be safely home on the evening tide.”6 This did not work out the way they had planned it.
The plan started out as Operation Rutter. The operation was cancelled abruptly after months
of planning and special training for the Canadians, when the 250 Canadian ships, ready to attack
Dieppe the next day, were discovered by German bombers. This ruined all hopes of maintaining the
element of surprise and contributed to the cancellation of Operation Rutter.7 The final decision to
cancel was also due to poor weather conditions on the day of the raid.8 Historian Norman S. Leach
notes that, “While many in the Allied headquarters wanted to permanently cancel the raid, the new
Chief of Combined Operations—Louis Mountbatten—did not.”9 The plan was practically unchanged
and renamed Operation Jubilee.
During Operation Rutter, while soldiers were in their ships preparing for the assault, they
were told that Dieppe was the target. When the plan was cancelled and renamed, the target was not
changed. N.M. Christie notes that this was a massive security risk: “Normally when an operation
is remounted its destination was changed for security reasons.”10 With the risk of German spies
knowing the location, it is unclear why it was not changed. If this information had been leaked to
the Germans it would explain the large number of defensive obstacles placed at Dieppe, including
concrete barriers along paths and multiple anti-tank guns. Were these added before Operation Rutter
was planned, or after its location got out? The Canadian Encyclopedia makes it clear that there was a
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“need for better intelligence on beach conditions and German defences.”11 Dieppe was not thought to
be as fortified as it was. Could old intelligence before the location was leaked have changed this?
A total of 4,963 Canadians, 1,005 British commandos, and 50 U.S Rangers participated in
Operation Jubilee.12 However, Alex Herd notes that “Allied commanders knew the raid was risky.”13
There was a major push by Canadian Officers to involve the restless Canadian troops who had not
yet seen any action after three years at war. Canadian military historians J.L. Granatstein and Dean
Oliver write that “Lieutenant-General Harry Crerar heard rumors that Mountbatten was planning
a major raid, he demanded that the British Chiefs of Staff select Canadians for the task; it would be
good for morale, he judged.”14 Historians also speculate that the troops were not properly prepared
and lacked combat experience, which contributed to the failure of the operation. While they did
lack the experience, they trained intensely in land and sea tactics for months before the raid. The
Canadian government later insisted that the troops were “well trained and more prepared than
ever.”15 The Combined Operation leaders who formulated the plan should be the ones labelled not
properly prepared instead.
The plan was riddled with flaws from the start. Along with the massive security risk, the
entire plan was based on the element of surprise. Not only was this risky, but during the raid, as they
were crossing the English Channel, a group of ships were intercepted by a German convoy. The
interception alerted the enemy on shore, which delayed the raid. Most of the landing craft reached
the beaches late and dropped the troops off in full daylight.16 Even though the element of surprise was
essentially lost the raid was not called off. Instead, command thought that additional tank and naval
support would compensate for the lack of surprise.
Historian Terry Copp wrote that the Operation “seems to have been devised by men who
believe that battles could be won by surprise, speed, and shock effect of landing tanks alongside the
infantry.”17 This plan could have worked better if the tanks had been more successful on the beaches,
but a series of failures led to the ineffective deployment of the armored support. First, the tanks were
about 10 minutes late. This poor timing set the entire raid back and left hundreds of men vulnerable.
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Second, according to Norman Leach, “out of the 58 tanks prepared to assist in the raid, only 29 were
able to offload at the shore.”18 Third, most of the tanks used during the raid got stuck on the beach
almost immediately. Major Allen Glen, a Canadian soldier who was involved in the raid, remembered,
“You couldn’t pick worse terrain for a tracked vehicle, you turn the vehicle a little bit, the stones are
rolled into the track, and if you get too many going through at once you break your track.”19 This was
the unfortunate reality for many tank crews. Lastly, even the tanks that made it off the beach were
eventually stopped by the blockades set up by the Germans. The tanks were not able to get through
and soon became sitting ducks, leading Leach to sadly conclude that, “Unable to escape in time, all of
the tank crews were either killed or captured.”20 This error could have been avoided if the planners
had done their research. With the terrain at Dieppe being so unique, they should have recommended
training on similar ground to give a more realistic example of how the tanks would respond in action.
Instead, soldiers trained in England with slightly different terrain. Not only did this affect
the tanks, but it also caused issues with the landing craft. Caroline D’Amours notes that “Boats were
scattered all along the seafront because of smoke, the heavy fire and the currents.”21 While training
for these situations would have been a difficult task, a systematic order with proper timing of
approaching ships could have made a huge difference. Despite organization being vital for a raid of
this size, it was not practiced.
During the raid, the communication was poor and unreliable. D’Amours further notes,
“The faulty communication system between the beaches, the Royal Air Force, ships, and tanks during
the operation had resulted in a significant number of losses.”22 Calls for more support, retreat, and
other commands were hard to come by after landing. A miscommunication between the troops on
shore and the British Royal Marines led to reinforcements being sent to shore. “It was believed the
tanks were progressing well and the beach was in Canadian hands.”23 The moment the reinforcements
reached the beach they, however, realized that this report was inaccurate. Instead of landing craft
coming to pick up those who were still alive, they dropped more off, only adding to the casualties.
Sadly, many soldiers did not make it onto the beach.
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After both groups’ attempts to flank the enemy failed, those on the main beach were sitting
ducks. The initial force was supposed to “capture the Headlands” or cliffs “overlooking the Dieppe
Beach” and supply cover for the main assault.24 With failure on both sides, the main assault did not
stand a chance. The right flank was ill fated from the start. After being dropped off to begin their
assault soldiers realized they had been dropped at the wrong side of the Scie River. Leach notes: “With
no other way to cross the river, the Canadians were forced to enter the town of Pourville to use the
only available bridge.”25 The Germans foresaw this, and set up machine guns and anti-tank artillery to
defend the bridge. The South Saskatchewan Regiment’s fate was sealed after they were dropped in the
wrong location.
Prior to the raid, there are multiple examples of unrealistic expectations. Many thought that
the raid would be simple and that casualties would be low. Even though the planners knew that it was
risky, generals and other military leaders were not prepared for what was to come. The night before
the raid Major-General J.H. Roberts told the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division, which constituted
the main infantry assault force, “Don’t worry men, it’ll be a piece of cake.”26 Whether this was to ease
nerves or was a serious statement, it was inappropriate to lower expectations. His troops needed to
be as prepared as they could be, including knowing that the plan was risky and that giving full effort
was needed in order to succeed.
The final issue to address is the lack of approval. According to historians Brian Villa and
Peter Henshaw, after the failure of the raid, Churchill sought answers to “when and how formal
authorization for the raid was given.”27 This question remains unanswered and has since raised
even more. During a session of the Canadian House of Commons, Tommy Douglas of Weyburn,
Saskatchewan addressed confusion over the commanding roles. He stated, “We do not know whether
it was carried out under General McNaughton as commander of the Canadian forces overseas, or
whether it was under Lord Mountbatten who was in charge of the combined operation.”28 It had
been months since the raid and the Canadian government still had no knowledge of formal roles,
or who had command of the operation. After reviewing authorization requirements, Villa and
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Henshaw found that “existing procedures required of Mountbatten were missing from the archives.
Mountbatten himself admitted afterwards that he had no authority to proceed after the cancellation
of Operation Rutter, except on the basis of a new request.”29 Part of the process at the time was to
submit a full outline of the plan for review, but as stated by Villa and Henshaw, “It was never done.”
With a lack of formal approval, the raid was bound to be full of flaws. It can be speculated that
combined operations “lost” formal approval paperwork to release them from blame after the
raid failed.
Days after the Raid had taken place, the media began claiming it as a heroic victory. Multiple
newspapers used headlines like, “Daring Raid,”30 “Blazing Battle,”31 and “Allies Smash Nazi Defences.”32
All of these were misleading and prompted a false hope in the war effort at home. In reality, most
of the German defenses remained intact and questions had already arisen about the endless list of
flaws. While the raid did slightly weaken the German air force and led them to move more forces and
aircraft away from the Soviet Union, it still did not make up for the avoidable casualties and issues.
After the Dieppe Raid failed, research began immediately to determine why and who was
responsible. To this day, theories and speculations consume many historians who have dug into
the vast documentation of first-person accounts, newspapers, government documents, and other
research papers. Thousands have been affected by this disaster, and many are still emotional about the
outcome. Alan Saunders, a veteran who fought in the Dieppe raid, stated that, “I think it was one of
the biggest cock-ups of the Second World War and it never should have happened.” Historian Gerald
Gilbert summarizes that Saunders and others viewed it as “a costly lesson, and crass stupidity to think
that by frontal assault you could take an enemy-held port.”33 While many were upset and even angry
at those who put Operation Jubilee into action, there were some who did not share those feelings.
Shortly after the war, some researchers became to refer to the Dieppe Raid as the dress
rehearsal for the invasion of Normandy beach. Although there was a 67 percent casualty rate at
Dieppe, many claimed that multiple valuable lessons were learned.34 Granatstein and Oliver, for
example, note that, “Dieppe was a lesson on how not to mount an amphibious assault.”35 The Allied
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forces learned that in order to attack a coastal port, tanks and the element of surprise were not
enough. The Germans had heavily fortified the coast of occupied Europe during WWII and expected
an invasion on the Western front. The tall cliffs along the coast of France made the German defenses
even stronger. Yet, despite these impressive defenses, it was clear that if the Allies had any hopes of
reopening the Western front, an attack by sea would eventually be necessary. The Allies had to acquire
better intelligence of terrain and military defenses, along with improving proper communication
and general planning. How to make use of tanks also came into question. With such difficult terrain,
specialized landing craft and tanks would be needed.36
After all, Dieppe was only a raid. The entire goal of it was to display power and gain
intelligence on performing a synchronized sea/land assault. While the casualties were tremendous,
it did allow for vital gains in intelligence and brought the enemy’s focus towards the Western front
to help relieve the Russians as much as possible. Both sides of the Dieppe raid debate make good
points, but the flaws that surround the raid could have been avoided. With proper planning, approval,
and intelligence, the casualty rate could have been drastically lower. Yet, instead of calling for early
retirement resignations or imposing demotions of those in charge of the raid, the Canadian and
British militaries gave out promotions and medals. Was the Dieppe Raid a failure or a success? That is
still a hard question to answer.
* An earlier version of this essay was published in the University of Maine’s Armstrong Undergraduate
Journal of History in 2018.
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